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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










TERRY PEPPERS, agent of SKEE 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00614-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal due to a Jurisdictional Defect,  
a Decision on the Issuance of a Certificate of Appealability, and  
for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 10, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 







 Terry Peppers appeals, pro se, from a District Court order denying his 
request to reopen the District Court‟s prior decision denying his request for a 
2 
 
modification of sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court‟s order. 
I. Background 
 Peppers pleaded guilty to firearm offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), and he was sentenced in May 2007 to a term of 130 months of 
imprisonment.  In March 2008, Peppers sent a letter to the District Court 
“regard[ing an] article [he] read in [T]he Star Ledger about Passiac County Jail,” 
and asked “[if he was] eligible for any . . . downward [sentencing] departure?”  
The District Court construed the letter as a request to modify his sentence pursuant 
to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in July 2008 the 
District Court denied the request as untimely.
1
  Peppers did not appeal.  In June 
2011, he filed a motion, citing Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
arguing that he had intended his letter to be a timely motion under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.  The District Court denied the motion by order entered December 13, 2011, 
and Peppers appeals.   
II. Jurisdiction 
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  The District Court noted that in United States v. Sutton, 2007 WL 3170128 
(D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2007, No. 07-426) and United States v. Ortiz, 2007 WL 4208802 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 27, 2007, Nos. 06-858, 07-256), it had granted downward variances below the 
sentencing guideline range based on conditions in the Passaic County Jail, a facility 




We begin with a question of appellate jurisdiction.  The District Court 
construed Peppers‟ March 2008 letter as a motion under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  That construction was entirely plausible, and Peppers did not 
timely appeal it.  Peppers much later filed a motion for reopening, citing the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
are not applicable to criminal cases, motions for reopening and reconsideration 
may, of course, be filed in criminal cases.  See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 
282, 286 (3d Cir. 2003).  Under these circumstances, we think it proper to apply 
the rules governing appeals in criminal cases.  Thus, Peppers had 14 days to appeal 
the District Court‟s denial of reopening.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).   
  The District Court did not receive Peppers‟ notice of appeal until January 4, 
2012, 22 days after the entry of the District Court‟s order.  Peppers, however, is 
entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 
266, 270-72 (1988), and he turned his notice of appeal over to prison officials on 
December 30, 2011, only three days beyond the Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) deadline.  
Peppers has also alleged that it took eight days for the District Court‟s order to 
reach him.  In an appropriate case, we might ask the District Court for factfinding 
as to how much of the time delay was attributable to the prison.  See United States 
v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312, 313 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Long v. Atlantic City Police 
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Dep‟t, 670 F.3d 436, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2012) (reaffirming Grana‟s vitality).  We 
need not do so here, though, because the 14-day period for appeals in a criminal 
case is non-jurisdictional, see Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 329 (3d 
Cir. 2010), and the Government has not pressed the timeliness issue.
2
  We 
therefore turn to the merits.  We review the District Court‟s denial of a motion for 
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion only.  See Max‟s Seafood Cafe ex rel. 
Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III. Discussion 
Under the version of Rule 35(a) applicable to Peppers,
3
 “[w]ithin 7 days 
after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, 
technical, or other clear error.”  This seven-day time limit is jurisdictional.  United 
States v. Higgs, 504 F.3d 456, 463 (3d Cir. 2007) (contrasting the time limit in 
Rule 35 with the Supreme Court‟s decision in Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 
12 (2005), regarding Rule 33).  In this case, Peppers was sentenced in May 2007 
and he filed his letter, which was construed as a Rule 35 motion, in March 2008.  
The District Court, therefore, understandably determined that it lacked jurisdiction 
                                              
2
  To the extent that this proceeding should be governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)‟s 60-day 
time limit, Peppers‟ appeal is, of course, timely.  
 
3
  The former version of Rule 35(a) applies because Peppers filed the March 2008 letter 
before the section was amended.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 Advisory Comm. Notes. 
5 
 
to modify Peppers‟ sentence under Rule 35.  Nothing in Peppers‟ motion to reopen 
called the District Court‟s jurisdictional  analysis or timeliness calculation into 
question in any way.
4
 
 Peppers now argues that the District Court was required to allow him an 
opportunity to challenge the characterization of his letter as a Rule 35 motion.  In 
support, he cites Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), and United States v. 
Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999).  Peppers misapprehends those opinions.  In 
Castro and Miller, the courts were concerned about the strict limitations that the 
Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) placed on § 2255 motions.  
Castro, 540 U.S. at 377; Miller, 197 F.3d at 645.  Therefore, in Castro, the 
Supreme Court held that “when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigant‟s 
[pleading] as a first § 2255 motion[,] . . . the district court must notify the pro se 
litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant . . . [of] the 
restrictions on „second or subsequent‟ motions, and provide the litigant an 
opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 
claims he believes he has.”  540 U.S. at 383.  Miller was similarly concerned about 
                                              
 
4
  We note, of course, that the time for appealing the District Court‟s 2008 order long ago 
ran.  Moreover, vehicles such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) cannot be used to provide an 




ensuring that a movant be allowed to make a knowledgeable decision before 
proceeding via § 2255.  The opinions do not require district courts, as here, to 
make a searching inquiry before treating a letter a something other than a § 2255 
motion.  See 197 F.3d at 646.   
 Here, there was no indication that Peppers‟ March 2008 letter challenged his 
conviction or incarceration in a way § 2255 anticipates,
5
 as Peppers‟ letter simply 
stated that “[he was] curious to know [if his sentence was] eligible for any . . . 
downward departure.”  While a court must construe a pro se litigant‟s pleadings 
liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), it need not act as his 
advocate, see Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004).  The District Court 
generously treated Peppers‟ brief letter as a Rule 35 motion.  Peppers has not now 
shown that the District Court erred somehow by failing to do more.   
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.6   
 
                                              
5
  Peppers sought a downward sentencing departure based on the harsh conditions in 
Passaic County Jail.  Because this claim could, and should, have been brought at 
sentencing and on direct appeal, his ability to bring it in a § 2255 motion was, we note, 
quite limited.  See, e.g., United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 979 (3d Cir. 1993), 
abrogated on other grounds by LAR 31.3 (describing such a “default” of a claim).  
Nothing in Peppers‟ brief letter to the District Court suggested the “cause” necessary to 
proceed with such a “defaulted” claim.  This makes the District Court‟s failure to 
construe Peppers‟ letter as a § 2255 motion all the more unsurprising. 
 
6
  To the extent, if any, that Peppers requests or needs a certificate of appealability, the 
request is DENIED.  See 28 U.S.C. §  2253(c). 
